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“First things first” – German Federal High Court provides guidance on the scope of 
secondary liability of internet service providers for online copyright infringement 
Name/citation of relevant case/legislation/material 
BGH, Urteil vom 26.11.2015 - I ZR 3/14; BGH, Urteil vom 26.11.2015 - I ZR 174/14 – 
[Stȍrerhaftung des Access-Providers]  
Single sentence summary 
The German Federal High Court has held in two decisions from 26th November 2015 that 
internet service providers can generally be held liable for illegal contents disseminated 
through their services by third parties with the caveat that claimants would first need to 
exhaust all reasonable measures to enforce their rights against the primary infringers. 
Legal context 
The German Federal High Court has taken the opportunity to discuss and further develop the 
possible liability of intermediaries for the dissemination of infringing files containing 
copyright protected works according to the German doctrine of “Störerhaftung” (this could be 
described as liability for disturbances or interferences but could also be considered as a 
breach of duty of care). This doctrine was developed by German courts through an analogy 
from property law. It foresees that someone who, albeit not directly involved in an 
infringement of an absolute right such as copyright, can still be found liable where his or her 
actions or omissions are adequately-causal for the infringement of such a right. The party is 
liable because it has the factual power over the occurrence of the disturbance (i.e. the 
infringement of copyright).  Omissions by the defendants are particularly relevant in the 
present context of internet service providers’ (ISPs) liability since the courts generally have 
regarded that negligence with regards to certain monitoring duties would trigger liability. The 
claimant can demand removal of the disturbance and prevention of further disturbances but 
no damages.  
The German legislator envisaged that this doctrine would be applicable in cases of Article 
8(3) of Directive 2001/29/EC (InfoSoc Directive). According to this provision, Member 
States have to “ensure that right holders are in a position to apply for an injunction against 
intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe a copyright or related 
right”. The discussed decisions come after the CJEU’s decision on UPC Telekabel 
(C-314/12; 27 March 2014). There, the European Court has held that ISPs are intermediaries 
pursuant to Article 8(3) of the InfoSoc Directive. This has the important consequence that 
ISPs can be the target of an injunction of right holders when their services are used by third 
parties to infringe copyright. The CJEU underlined that national law of the Member States 
would govern the conditions and procedure of injunctive relief against intermediaries. The 
German Federal High Court now discussed the particularities of liability for internet access 
providers under “Störerhaftung”. 
 
 
 
 Facts 
The claimant of the first proceeding (I ZR 3/14) was GEMA, the collecting society for 
performers rights in Germany. The defendant was Germany’s largest telecommunication 
company whose services provided its clients with internet access. This service enabled the 
defendant’s clients to access the website “3dl.am”. The claimant alleged that this website 
provided access to a collection of links and URLs to so-called “sharehosters” such as 
“rapidshare”, “netload” and “uploaded” where musical works have been uploaded without 
authorisation of the right holders. Alleging that this would violate GEMA’s copyright, it 
demanded that the defendant would seize to provide access to these works through their 
services. Both, first and second instance courts (the Regional and Higher Regional Court of 
Hamburg) however discarded the claims made by GEMA. 
A similar factual scenario underlies the second case (I ZR 174/14). Claimants here were 
music publishers, while the defendant was again an internet access provider. The claimants 
argued that the defendant provided access to the website “goldesel.to” (“Goldesel” means 
“golden donkey” in German). This website displayed links to musical works from the file-
sharing network “eDonkey” which have been uploaded there without authorisation of the 
right holders. Similarly to the first decision, the claimants sought from the defendants to seize 
providing access to the “Goldesel” website based on the “Störerhaftung”-doctrine. Again, 
both first and second instance courts (the Regional and Higher Regional Court of Cologne) 
rejected this claim. 
Analysis 
Both decisions of the German Federal High Court agreed with the findings of the respective 
second instance courts that copyright was violated in both cases. With regards to the first 
decision, the Court held that the links to the relevant works which could be found on and 
were downloadable from the “3dl.am” website would violate the making available right 
pursuant to § 19a of the German Author’s Rights Act. The second decision also affirmed that 
the claimants’ copyright was violated. The internet access provided by the defendant would 
enable access to the website “goldesel.to” where the protected works could be downloaded by 
its customers.  Both decisions by the Federal High Court, however, concluded that the 
internet access provider would not be liable as primary infringers since they were neither 
perpetrator nor participants of the copyright infringement. 
What remained was the claimants’ argument that the respective defendants were liable 
pursuant to the “Störerhaftung”-doctrine. The Court outlined the application of the doctrine 
for internet access providers in a textbook manner in these two factually similar scenarios. It 
emphasised that, while third parties could be found liable for the actions of primary infringers 
under this doctrine, it could only be raised where the defendants violated certain monitoring 
duties. This caveat serves to set limits to the liability as “Störer”. Such a limitation would be 
necessary since parties potentially found liable under this doctrine are not committing the 
actual infringement themselves. The Court held that the scope of such monitoring duties 
would generally depend on whether and how for such duties could be considered as being 
reasonable for the defendant under the given circumstances.   
 
The Court provided some guidance as to what considerations influence the assessment of 
such reasonableness expected by internet access providers. On the one hand, a general 
monitoring obligation would not be considered as reasonable since this would contravene § 7 
(2)(1) the German Telemedia Act which implements Article 15 (1) Directive 2000/31/EC (E-
Commerce Directive). The latter provision establishes that providers do not have “to monitor 
the information which they transmit or store, nor a general obligation actively to seek facts or 
circumstances indicating illegal activity”. On the other hand, the Court emphasised that both 
Article 8 (3) of the InfoSoc Directive and Article 11 S. 3 of Directive 2004/48/EC 
(Enforcement Directive) would be relevant in the assessment of reasonableness of monitoring 
duties of internet service providers. These provisions generally enable right holder to seek for 
injunctive relief against intermediaries whose services are being used by third parties to 
violate copyright. The Court specifically used the “spider-in-the-web” argument from Recital 
59 of the InfoSoc Directive whereby service providers are often best placed to terminate 
copyright violations on the internet.  
By applying these principles, the Court held that internet access providers would provide an 
adequately–causal contribution to the copyright infringement of third parties in the discussed 
cases. This is because the defendants’ services would enable the contact between their clients 
and the infringing third party. This finding, however, is not unproblematic. The Court has 
held that the copyright infringement in question was the making available of the copyright 
protected work without authorisation and relied here on a similar finding in paragraph 31 of 
the CJEU in UPC Telekabel. Strictly saying, the making available of a work without 
authorisation by third parties and the resulting copyright infringement would also occur 
where the defendants, i.e. internet access providers, would have no involvement at all. This is 
because the primary infringers commit the copyright infringement in question by uploading 
the infringing material which does not require the involvement of the defendant’s service. 
These services are rather causally linked to the reproduction of persons downloading the 
work. This unclear approach to causality may stipulate that the Court’s line of argumentation 
is motivated by “forging” the “Störerhaftung” doctrine to meet with European parameters 
provided by UPC Telekabel.  
With respect to the necessary monitoring duties, the Court added an important differentiation 
between the services provided by the defendants from other services. It held that the 
defendants’ services in providing internet access are generally legal and socially desirable 
which would not necessarily purport and enhance the possibility of copyright infringements. 
Such services, however, need to be contrasted with other factual constellations where the 
service providers’ business model is aimed at purporting copyright infringements by its users 
or where the service provider furthers such copyright violations due to its own actions. By 
referring to its previous decision in Cybersky (I-ZR 57/07; 15 January 2009), the German 
Federal High Court has held that in this latter scenario service providers would have an ex-
ante monitoring duty.  
In the present cases, however, the Court found that there would not be a general monitoring 
duty by the defendants. Otherwise, this would make the economic model of the defendants 
business not viable, as the Court argued, and underlined this finding by reference to the CJEU 
decisions in L’Oréal v Ebay (C-324/09; 12 July 2011) and   SABAM v Netlog (C-360/10; 16 
February 2012). It added that, while a general, ex-ante monitoring duty would not exist in the 
present scenario, a duty to monitor would arise where the respective claimants made the 
defendants aware of concrete copyright violations of specific musical works. It referred to its 
Alone in the Dark – decision (I-ZR 18/11; 12 July 2012) which discussed the liability of the 
file hosting service “rapidshare” for making infringing material available uploaded by its 
customers. By applying this finding to the discussed decisions, the Court sees such duties to 
also apply to internet access providers. 
Both decisions discussed the fundamental rights aspects surrounding the question of 
reasonableness which led the Court to criticise some findings by the second instance courts 
with this regards. The Federal Court initially mentioned the possible affected rights such as 
the property right of the copyright holder, the occupational freedom of the internet service 
provider and the freedom of information of internet users. In doing so, the Court provided an 
interesting analysis of the applicability of national fundamental rights vis-a-vis EU 
fundamental rights. It found that national fundamental rights could also be applied. The 
measures envisaged within Article 8(3) InfoSoc Directive and Article 11 sentence 3 of the 
Enforcement Directive would allow EU Member States to regulate the modalities of orders 
against service providers for alleged copyright infringement by users of the services. Since 
these modalities could be regulated by national legislators, German Fundamental Rights 
would remain applicable. 
The Court then applied a classical fundamental rights discourse in both decisions to establish 
what would be considered to be reasonable monitoring duties for the defendants. It held that 
the copyright holder could, on the one hand, rely on the right to property based on Article 
17(2) of the EU Charter and Article 14 (1) of the German Basic Law which is however not 
without limitations. On the other hand, it affirmed that the defendants could rely on their right 
on occupational freedom which primarily encompasses the freedom to freely distribute over 
ones financial, economic and technical resources. The Court found that the administrative, 
technical and financial resources to enforce blocking orders would need to be factored in 
when balancing the fundamental rights positions of claimants and defendants. 
With regards to the rights enshrined in Article 7 of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights 
(right to respect private communication) or Article 10(1) of the German Basic Law (privacy 
of correspondence, posts and telecommunications), the Court found that these rights would 
not play a relevant factor here. The Court held that these fundamental rights would generally 
encompass the non-public communication of concrete persons while communication to the 
public as a whole would not be covered. Hence, blocking such communication through the 
measures envisaged would fall outside of the scope of these fundamental rights 
An important issue was discussed by the Court in relation to whether the effectiveness of the 
sought blocking measures would affect the reasonableness of monitoring duties by the 
defendants. Both Higher District Court decisions argued that such measures would not be 
reasonable because they lacked effectiveness. They argued that blocking would not totally 
eradicate the availability of websites displaying infringing material but only would make 
access more difficult. The German Federal Supreme Court, however, discarded this 
effectiveness argument by the Regional Higher Courts. The Court applied the CJEU’s 
reasoning in UPC Telekabel that actions which would not fully eradicate IP infringements are 
not as such disallowed. Based on this reasoning, the German Federal High Court applied a 
pragmatic approach within the second decision. It stated that not all internet users would be 
able and willing to circumvent the blocking measures. Additionally, these countermeasures 
would not make blocking orders unreasonable. Otherwise, right holders would be left without 
any remedy. The Court held that the habit of changing host providers or shifting the server 
from one country to another would rather make blocking orders against access providers a 
necessity. 
 Furthermore, the Court provided an interesting elaboration as to whether a blocking order 
remains to be a reasonable measure where it would also block access to legal material. In the 
first decision, the Higher Regional District Court argued that blocking legal content could 
amount to censorship. The second instance Court in the second decision held that the 
claimants would not have the right to enforce copyright on behalf of other right holders nor 
would they be able to enforce “copyright” for works which were in the public domain. With 
regards to this issue of “overblocking”, the Federal High Court considered again the 
jurisprudence of the CJEU in UPC v Telekabel.  There, the CJEU held blocking measures 
would, inter alia, be possible where “(i) they do not unnecessarily deprive internet users of 
the possibility of lawfully accessing the information available”. 
The Federal Court made an important point on this issue. It generally held that a blocking 
order is not only available where the entire material on a website would constitute infringing 
material and where the website’s business model is based on copyright violation. They are 
rather already available where the website inserts some legal contents. The Court supported 
this finding with its jurisprudence on file-hosting (e.g. Alone in the Dark – supra). There, it 
was held that compliance with monitoring duties would not be considered unreasonable for 
the sake of protecting copyright even where this leads to the deletion of legal contents in 
some isolate cases. This should, however, only impair the legal content of the service 
provider marginally and should not fundamentally challenge its business model. Hence, the 
German Federal High Court concluded here, in contrast to both appellate decisions, that a 
blocking order is not only available where the website exclusively hosts infringing material. 
Rather, it is also available where the amount of legal material on the website in question is 
only marginal in contrast to the illegal material.   
Finally, the Court held that the order sought by the claimants based on the doctrine of 
“Störerhaftung” was not reasonable. This was because the claimants did not sufficiently seek 
to enforce their copyright against the primary infringers, i.e. the operator and the host 
provider of “3d.al in the first decision and the website operator of “goldesel” in the second 
one. The Court did so because the internet access providers were conducting a lawful and 
neutral business with regards to the copyright violations of their users. Based on the principle 
of proportionality, the defendants could only be found liable where all enforcement attempts 
against the direct infringers or host providers have been exhausted or were futile ab initio. 
Internet access providers can only be held liable after all these measures have been taken by 
the claimants. The Court found that otherwise a gap in protection would occur. In the present 
scenario, the liability based on “Störerhaftung” generally applies subsidiarily because the 
aforementioned parties are much closer to the infringement than the internet service provider 
that merely provides access to these materials. This marks a new approach since previously 
both primary infringers and such liable according to “Störerhaftung” could be sued together 
or alternatively. 
The Court found that the claimants in the present cases have not exhausted all means against 
the primary infringers. In the first case, the claimants stated that they were granted an interim 
injunction against the operator of the website “3dl.to”. The order was, however, not 
deliverable because the address was fictitious with a wrong postcode. In the second case, the 
claimants argued that measures against the primary infringer were not possible since the 
website did not provide the identity of the website host. Additionally, they sought injunctive 
relief against the operator of the host server of the website in Russia but were unsuccessful. 
For an action against the access provider to be successful, the Court, however, held that the 
claimant would need to apply more efforts to investigate the real identity of the primary 
infringers. It stated that further reasonable measure should have been conducted in both cases 
such as hiring private investigators or engaging with competent administrative bodies that 
deal with copyright infringement to investigate the identity or address of the infringer. 
Practical significance 
The Court acknowledged the obligation reiterated by the UPC Telekabel decision that 
Member States have to provide injunctive relief for right holders against internet service 
providers whose service have been used by third parties for copyright infringements. Hence, 
making “Störerhaftung” applicable for the possible liability of internet access providers 
seemed to be the leitmotif of the BGH in the discussed decisions. This has led to some 
questionable approaches, such as the issue of causality or the remaining question of how 
much legal material on a website would tilt the blocking of a website to be unreasonable.  
With regards to the practical aspects, the German Federal High Court stated with some clarity 
when it would hold what actions with regards to enforcing copyright against the primary 
infringers as futile. Right holders are held to first attempt to enforce copyright against the 
primary infringers before seeking enforcement against internet access providers – so first 
things first!  
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